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Abstract—A honeypot is a type of security facility deliberately
created to be probed, attacked and compromised. It is often used
for protecting production systems by detecting and deflecting
unauthorized accesses. It is also useful for investigating the
behaviour of attackers, and in particular, unknown attacks. For
the past 17 years much effort has been invested in the research
and development of honeypot based techniques and tools and
they have evolved to become an increasingly powerful means
of defending against the creations of the blackhat community.
In this paper, by studying multiple honeypot systems, the two
essential elements of honeypots - the decoy and the security
program - are captured and presented, together with two abstract
organizational forms - independent and cooperative - in which
these two elements can be integrated. A novel decoy and security
program (D-P) based taxonomy is proposed, for the purpose
of investigating and classifying the various techniques involved
in honeypot systems. An extensive set of honeypot projects and
research, which cover the techniques applied in both independent
and cooperative honeypots, is surveyed under the taxonomy
framework. Finally, the taxonomy is applied to a wide set of tools
and systems in order to demonstrate its validity and predict the
tendency of honeypot development.
Index Terms—Honeypots, Computer Security, Virtualization,
Network Security, Intrusion Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
THE new domain of cyberspace is so pervasive that theUS Department of Defense has put cyberspace on a par
with land, sea, and air as a war-fighting domain [1]. Systems
in cyberspace are constantly faced with cyber threats every
day. In 2015, Symantec discovered 54 zero-day vulnerabilities,
a 125 percent increase from the year before [2]. Since
cyber threats cannot be eliminated completely, the strategy
to securing cyberspace is to remove as many vulnerabilities
as possible before they can be exploited [3]. A honeypot is
a vital security facility aimed at sacrificing its resource to
investigate unauthorized accesses in order to discover potential
vulnerabilities in operational systems, and reduce the risks.
Due to its unique design and application features, it can help
to address the deficiencies of other existing security methods.
Firewalls are often deployed around the perimeter of an
organization in order to block unauthorized access by filtering
certain ports [4] and content, but they do little to evaluate
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the traffic. They can block all accesses to a certain service in
order to prevent malevolent traffic, but this also blocks any
benevolent traffic that wants to access the service. Conversely,
honeypots are aimed at opening ports in order to capture
as many attacks as possible for subsequent data analysis.
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is used to evaluate the
traffic and detect any inappropriate, incorrect, and anomalous
activity. However, IDSs often have the “false alert problem”,
i.e. signature (rule-based) IDSs often generate false negative
alerts, whilst anomaly-based IDSs generate false positive
alerts. Compared to an IDS, a honeypot has the big advantage
that it never generates false alerts, because any observed traffic
to it is suspicious since there is no production service running
on the honeypot. Hence, an integration of a honeypot with an
IDS can largely reduce the number of false alerts [5].
An intrusion prevention system (IPS), comprising a firewall
plus an IDS, can evaluate the traffic and block malicious
data. It acts as a shield against attacks, but it is not able
to distinguish whether an application-layer request is normal
or not. This drawback could potentially result in attacks
permeating the shield without being detected. For example,
a social engineering attacker may gain sensitive information
by using a compromised legitimate username and password
[6]. However, if an IPS integrates with a honeypot, the whole
system can then capture all attacking activities regardless of
whether they are performed by inside or outside adversaries.
In addition, the data captured by honeypots can be used to
create countermeasures, e.g. the automated intrusion response
systems (AIRS) often uses honeypots as the data capture
infrastructure [7].
Honeypots are often used to investigate currently-unknown
attacks [5], [8]. The Blackhat community is intelligent enough
to create new-unknown threats. A good way to investigate new
threats is to capture the malicious activity step-by-step as it
compromises a system. Honeypots therefore can add value
to research by providing a sacrificial system to be attacked.
Furthermore, it is worth observing what the adversaries do in
the compromised system, such as communicating with other
attackers and uploading new rootkits. Also, honeypots can
effectively capture automated attacks [9], [10]. Due to the
fact that automated attacks often target the entire network,
honeypots can quickly capture them for investigation.
Hence, according to different security requirements, a
variety of honeypots have been proposed, i.e. there is not
only dedicated honeypot software [11], but also complex
cooperative honeypot systems, such as honeynets [12] and
hybrid systems [10], [9], [13], etc. However, there is a lack
of a distinct method that can quickly catch the key points
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of the various honeypots and that can discover new insights,
and advance research and development in this area. Our work
proposes to address these problems. The main contributions
of this paper can be summarized as follows:
 Two essential elements (decoy and security program)
of a honeypot are captured. How these are organized
is described, and this can provide a general view for
analyzing diverse honeypot systems.
 A novel decoy and security program (D-P) based
taxonomy is proposed to investigate different aspects of
honeypot technology.
 Several development trends are identified by comparing
honeypots according to the taxonomy.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows:
Section 2 defines the core concepts and terminology; Section 3
proposes a way to investigate different honeypot technologies
by providing a novel D-P based taxonomy; Section 4 surveys
a number of honeypots based on the taxonomy in order to
analyze their development; Section 5 makes a conclusion.
II. HONEYPOT ANATOMY
The first idea for honeypots comes from the book titled
“The Cuckoo’s Egg” [14] that described a series of events
about tracking a hacker. The second material about honeypots
was reported in a whitepaper [15]. The definition of honeypot
was proposed by Spitzner in 2003 [16]: “A honeypot is
an information system resource whose value lies in the
unauthorized or illicit use of that resource.” However, this
definition describes a honeypot based on its application value,
rather than what it is. We therefore provide a clearer definition
of what a honeypot is (see Figure 1)
Decoy:
Security Program :
Tight coupling Loose coupling
Honeypot = +
Fig. 1. Honeypot Anatomy: core elements and their organizations.
A honeypot is an information system that includes two
essential elements, decoys and security programs. It is used
to deliberately sacrifice its information resources by allowing
unauthorized and illicit use for the purpose of security
investigation. The decoy can be any kind of information
system resource, and the security program facilitates
the security related functions, such as attack monitoring,
prevention, detection, response and profiling. In addition, the
security programs should be running in stealth mode to avoid
detection.
Among the existing honeypot projects and honeypot
research work, the terminology is not consistent. Some refer
to decoys as honeypots. For example, a decoy can be a fake
digital entity. The terminology for digital entity acting as a
decoy is honeytoken [16]. In the book “The Cuckoo’s Egg”,
Stoll deployed honeytokens, i.e. digital files, with security
programs to track a German hacker. Thus, the honeytoken is a
decoy, but Stoll’s system is a honeypot system. Our definition
clarifies that a vulnerable system without any security program
is only a decoy rather than a honeypot. Unless it is equipped
with a security program then we do not call it a honeypot.
The organization of the two essential elements can be
roughly categorised according to their degree of coupling:
loose and tight (see Figure 1). Coupling refers to the amount
of direct knowledge that one component has of another. Loose
coupling is one in which each component has, or makes use
of, little or no knowledge of the other separate ones. It enables
components to remain completely autonomous and unaware of
each other while still interfacing with each other. In contrast,
tight coupling is when a group of components are highly
dependent on one another, or are built into the same unit to
perform the task. An independent honeypot refers to one
using tight coupling, and a cooperative honeypot indicates
one using loose coupling. Nawrocki et al. [11] surveyed a
number of honeypots that are independent honeypots, while
complex systems such as the honeynets [12] and hybrid
systems [10], [9], [13] are cooperative honeypots. In this
paper, we use the term “honeypot” and “honeypot system”
interchangeably.
III. REVIEW WITH D-P BASED TAXONOMY
This section proposes a novel D-P based taxonomy as
Figure 2 shows. The classification scheme is divided into
two categories. The first category includes the features of
a decoy, and the second one consists of the functions of a
security program. The D-P based taxonomy is used as a basic
conceptual model in order to investigate honeypot technology.
Under this taxonomy framework, we review typical honeypots
and specific honeypot-related techniques. The terminology in
this paper is described in a technical way, which can make
their definitions distinct and easy to understand.
A. Features of decoy
The decoy aims to capture data by being attacked. There
are several primitive characteristics that comprise the design
of a decoy.
1) Fidelity: It denotes the degree of exactness of an
information system resource that the decoy provides to the
attacker. It classifies the interaction into three levels: low,
medium, high (see Figure 3).
Application
Operating System
Emulated 
Application
Operating System
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Fig. 3. Three types of fidelity.
Low-interaction honeypot (LIH) only provides a little
interaction to adversaries. The LIH decoy is also known by
another name: facade. A traditional LIH, e.g. Honeyd [17],
is a program that emulates the protocols of an operating
system (OS), but with a limited subset of the full functionality.
Consequently an adversary is not able to compromise a LIH
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Fig. 2. D-P based Taxonomy of honeypot systems.
because there are only the fingerprints of OS functions instead
of the real functionality. A LIH system can provide a security
program to monitor the facade in order to capture the network
activity.
Medium-interaction honeypot (MIH) provides much more
interaction to the adversaries. However, unlike an LIH, a MIH
does not implement the TCP/IP stack by itself. Instead, MIHs,
e.g. Dionaea [18] and Cowrie [19], bind to sockets and leave
the OS to do the connection management. In contrast to LIHs
that implement network protocols, the simulation algorithm of
MIHs is based on emulating logical application responses for
incoming requests. Thus, the request arriving to the MIH will
be watched and examined, and fake responses will be created
by the security program of the MIH.
High-interaction honeypot (HIH) is a fully functional
system that can be completely compromised by adversaries.
Its decoy is often a genuine system, such as Argos [8] and
Cuckoo Sandbox [20]. Because the fully functional honeypot
can be compromised, the HIH must equip the security toolkits
for system activity capture and outgoing traffic containment.
A hybrid honeypot system often consists of decoys
of different interaction levels, e.g. Artail’s hybrid honeypot
framework [9], and Bailey’s [10] and Lengyel’s [13] hybrid
honeypot architectures. In a hybrid system, the LIHs or MIHs
are often used as front ends for large-scale deployments
and the HIHs are used as back ends for deep investigation.
These distributed front ends are named sinkholes, which
could be the devices (i.e. sensors, redirectors, etc.), such as
network telescopes [21], darknet [22], blackholes [23], IMS
[24], and iSinks [25], or software artifices assigned with a
portion of the routed IP address space. Instead of deploying a
large number of HIHs across multiple networks, they can be
centrally deployed in a consolidated location, which is called
honeyfarm, such as the one used in Potemkin [26].
2) Scalability: it represents the capability to provide a
growing number of decoys, or its potential to be enlarged to
accommodate that growth. It is classified into two categories:
unscalable and scalable. An unscalable honeypot only includes
a certain number (one or more) of decoys and cannot change
the number, e.g. Argos [8] can only monitor one virtual
decoy. On the contrary, a scalable honeypot system can deploy
multiple decoys and its security program is able to monitor
those decoys simultaneously, e.g. Honeyd [17] is able to
emulate multiple OS fingerprinting artifices at the same time.
A honeynet is a type of scalable honeypot system. The term
of honeynet was proposed by [12], [27], which define a
honeynet as a network consisting of HIHs that provide real
systems, applications, and services for adversaries to interact
with. The data captured by scalable honeypots deployed in
multiple domains often need to be collected by secure channels
and stored in an isolated data center for further analysis.
3) Adaptability: it refers to the reconfiguration capability
to adapt the state of the decoy to changed circumstances.
It has two levels: static and dynamic. Traditional static
honeypots, e.g. Specter [28] and Dionaea [18], need the
security researcher to determine the configuration beforehand
and manually configure/reconfigure it. This static configuration
scheme has several drawbacks: 1) it is a complex task to
manually configure honeypots; 2) the static configuration
scheme is not able to make an instant response to an intrusion
event; 3) it is not able to adapt to changes in the objective of
the cloned network. In contrast, a dynamic honeypot is able to
adapt to specific events in a timely manner. It is able to change
its configuration periodically, or even adapt to environmental
changes in real-time, and respond to intrusion events, e.g.
Honeyd [17] and Glastopf [29].
4) Role: it describes in which side the decoy plays within
a multi-tier architecture. A honeypot can play two roles:
server and client. This refers to whether a honeypot actively
detects malicious program or passively captures unauthorized
traffic. Most honeypots are server side ones, e.g. Honeyd
[17] and Dionaea [18], which passively wait being attacked.
Adversaries find these honeypots on their own initiative and
probe and attack them. Most server-side honeypots never
advertise themselves, but some can “advertise” themselves,
e.g. Glastopf [29] that works like a normal web server with a
number of vulnerable paths and scripts (referred to as dorks)
so that the attackers can index them by using a search engine
and/or web crawler. A client honeypot is used to investigate
client-side intrusion. This type of honeypot can actively initiate
requests to servers and investigate malicious program on the
server side, such as Ghost [30].
5) Physicality / Virtuality (P/V): it denotes the state of
decoys as they actually exist, which can be divided into two
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categories: physical and virtual. A physical honeypot refers
to a genuine computer system running on a physical machine
and acting as a decoy. Indeed, physical honeypot often implies
high-interaction, but could have higher performance than a
virtual HIH. However, it is infeasible to deploy physical
honeypots for each IP address in a large address space. The
contrary concept is virtual honeypot that uses virtual decoys
that need the host machine to respond to network traffic sent to
the virtual decoys [31]. We can have multiple virtual honeypots
hosted concurrently by one physical machine.
Although according to the definition of a honeypot, any
type of information system resource can be deployed as a
decoy, the use of virtualization technologies has important
advantages in terms of ease of management and maintenance.
On the one hand, all the LIHs and MIHs are virtual honeypots
according to the nature of their design. The decoys of LIHs
are software artifices, which emulate the fingerprints of OSs
and services. On the other hand, HIHs can be virtualized
by using virtualization technologies. Galan et al. [32]
summarised the virtualization technology evolution through
three categories: baseline virtualization, testbed oriented
virtualization and datacenter oriented virtualization. Figure 4
shows the virtualization technologies used in deploying HIHs
over the last 17 years (dates are approximate).
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Fig. 4. Virtualization technologies for decoy deployment
For the HIHs using baseline virtualization technologies, the
first example is the User-Mode Linux (UML). This was used
as the virtualization engine to mimic the Gen II Honeynet
in [33], where the host machine runs the Honeywall to
contain and monitor the entire virtual honeynet. The host
can apply the built-in tty logging mechanism to silently
capture the keystrokes of the honeypots. However, UML
only enables Linux kernel-based virtual machines to run as
an application within a normal Linux host. Instead, Abbasi
and Harris [34] used a VMware server to deploy a virtual
Gen III Honeynet, which can support various OSs based
on the x86 architecture. Different from the previous work,
it applied a multi-system virtual honeynet architecture that
installs the Honeywall on a separate singe virtual machine
instead of the host. It also used Sebek to perform system
activity capture in the virtual honeypots. Similarly, the KVM
(Kernel-based Virtual Machine) hypervisor can also provide
emulation of different OSs. Capalik’s system [35] used the
low-level surveillance of the KVM hypervisor to stealthily
monitor the system activity from outside of the virtual
machine, which results in the attacks having no way to
bypass the surveillance. Recently, some novel lightweight
virtualization technologies have provided alternatives to the
hypervisor-based virtualization for honeypot deployment. For
example, Memari et al. [36] created a virtual honeynet, based
on LXC (Linux Containers), which can simultaneously create
multiple Linux user-space instances through partitioning the
resource of the host. An LXC based virtual machine can
startup very quickly, but it can only emulate Linux over Linux.
Another case in point is the honeypot [37] created using
Docker, which can implement a high-level API to provide
lightweight containers that run processes in isolation. The
Docker container is even more lightweight than the LXC
container since it implements application virtualization rather
than full system virtualization.
Because it is a complex task to manually generate all the low
level details for the creation of medium-to-big size honeypot
scenarios, several testbed oriented virtualization technologies
were proposed, which can be used to deploy virtual HIHs.
VNUML (Virtual Network User Mode Linux) [38] proposed
a high-level description for virtual honeynets and developed a
tool to process the description automatically, avoiding the user
having to deal with the complex low-level details. However, it
only focuses on using UML as its underlying technology so it
still can only emulate Linux kernel-based virtual machines.
Some generic tools that integrate multiple virtual machine
hypervisors were also proposed. NoSE (Network Simulation
Environment) [39] addressed the multi-hypervisor issue
through integrating a variety of virtual machine hypervisors,
such as UML, Xen and QEMU, into one generic platform.
The drawback of NoSE and the previous proposals is that
they lack the capability of dynamic configuration for the
honeynet deployment. VNX [40] is a more powerful generic
virtualized tool, which integrates more hypervisors, such as
UML, QEMU, KVM, LXC etc, and can even undertake
dynamic configuration. Following the idea of VNX, Fan et
al. proposed the Honeyvers [41] framework aimed at creating
and managing heterogeneous honeypots.
Apart from the tools described above, some other
multi-tenant datacenter oriented virtualization technologies
for HIHs deployment have also been proposed. Honeylab
[42] provides a platform to share IP address space and
computing resources. It is a distributed infrastructure overlay
that allows security researchers to create their own desired
honeypot systems without setting up distributed sensors in
various geographical locations. DarkNOC [43] is designed to
collect interesting traffic from different information sources,
e.g. NetFlow, Snort, and Nepenthes, to analyze the data and
present it to users in an efficient manner. In addition, Han et
al. proposed the HoneyMix [44] system that treats a honeypot
as a network security function and instantiates honeypots by
using Network Function Virtualization (NFV).
6) Deployment Strategy: it presents the pertinent tactics of
deploying decoys. There are five common decoy deployment
strategies: sacrificial lamb, deception ports, proximity decoys,
minefield and redirection shield.
Sacrificial lamb is a normal system, but without
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connections to production networks, which waits to be
compromised by attackers, e.g. Argos [8] and Cuckoo
Sandbox [20]. It can be a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
computer, a router, or a switch etc. The typical implementation
involves loading the operating system, configuring some
applications and then leaving it on the network to see what
happens. Sacrificial lambs provide a mean of analyzing a
compromised system down to the last byte. The analysis
often requires numerous third-party tools. They also do not
provide integrated traffic containment facilities, so will require
additional network considerations.
Deception ports indicate simulated services disguised
as well-known services on production systems. These are
basically LIHs or MIHs, such as Specter [28] and Dionaea
[18], which mimic various services on different ports of the
system, e.g. HTTP is mimicked on port 80. These honeypots
first “observe” the operating system they reside on and then
portray these services according to that. The basic idea is
deception so that the adversaries are “stuck-up” in solving the
deception from where they can be removed from the network.
Proximity decoys indicate that the decoys are deployed on
the same network as production systems and possibly clone
the configurations of the production systems. There will be no
legal hassles in monitoring the decoys, because they are part
of the same subnet as the production servers, and it is allowed
to monitor any activity pertaining to your own network. Also,
when some malicious attacks are detected on the production
systems, it is easier to either re-route them to the honeypots,
or trap them, since they are in proximity to the production
systems. Honeyd [17] can use the free IP addresses of a
production network to deploy and integrate the decoys into the
production network, which follows this deployment strategy.
Minefield means deploying a relatively large number of
honeypots at the perimeter or the forefront of the protected
network to act as landmines that “explode upon contact”, by
which we mean switch on the data capture function upon
contact. Any scans or vulnerability detectors can exploit the
contents of honeypots, sparing the production servers. So this
deployment strategy can be used to capture a large amount of
data. As stated, IDSs are placed at the perimeter, where they
can use the contents of honeypots to reduce the probability
of generating false alarms. Sinkholes, e.g. network telescopes
[21], often uses this deployment strategy.
Redirection shield uses port redirection or traffic re-routing
to forward malicious data to the honeypots. This strategy
needs intrusion detection technology to evaluate the network
traffic. If the traffic is interesting, it will be redirected to the
honeypot shield to avoid the production system being attacked.
The shield and the production network should be tightly
or loosely coupled. The honeypots can reside either in the
same address space as the production network or on another
subnet alongside the production network, or even remotely. For
example, Shadow Honeypots [5] following this deployment
strategy use the shadow application as a shield dealing with
the malicious traffic for anomaly-based detection.
7) Resource Type: it denotes the type of information
system resource available for the attacks. Most honeypots
provide or emulate general resources, and are aimed at
detection of more than one attack technique. Currently,
many specific resource oriented honeypot systems have been
proposed, as follows:
Web application honeypots are tools aimed at detection of
attacks on web application, e.g. Glastopf [29];
VoIP honeypots are used to capture threats in internet
telephony (Voice over IP), e.g. Artemisa [45];
SSH honeypots are oriented against secure shell (SSH)
attacks, e.g. Cowrie [19];
Bluetooth honeypots are aimed to capture attacks
propagating through Bluetooth devices, e.g. Bluepot
[46];
USB honeypots are used to investigate arbitrary malware on
USB storage devices, e.g. Ghost USB Honeypot [30];
SCADA/ICS honeypots emulate industrial control system
resources, e.g. Conpot [47];
IoT honeypots are used to capture attacks that target IoT
devices, e.g. the IoTPOT [48];
IPv6 network honeypots are tools used to capture attacks
targeting IPv6 networks, e.g. Hyhoneydv6 [49].
B. Functions of security program
As previously stated, the security program aims to carry out
all the security related functions, such as attack monitoring,
prevention, detection, response and profiling. This subsection
describes all these function in detail.
1) Attack Monitoring: it is aimed at logging all the
intrusion events and malicious behaviors to allow further
investigation. Two critical layers of data can be identified:
network activity (every inbound and outbound connection,
packet and header, as well as its payload, etc.), and system
activity (keystroke, system call, rootkits, etc.).
Surveying the techniques for capturing and collecting
network data, particularly in the case of cooperative
honeypots from distributed decoys, two widely used
network data forwarding methods were found: tunneling and
application-level proxying. Tunneling is used when some
distributed decoys, such as network telescopes, darknets,
and blackholes, are placed in a different location where the
processing backends are. As the decoys are assigned a portion
of the routed IP address space corresponding to its physical
location, a tunnel mechanism based on a tunneling protocol
such as GRE has to be used to transport data packets to the
backends. By using tunnels, the decoy backends seem to be
directly deployed in the production network, as the tunnel is
almost invisible to “traceroute”, although the tunnel will add
some latency and modify the MTU. Some hybrid systems [26],
[50] use GRE tunnels to forward the inbound data from the
frontends to the backends. Application-level proxying consist
of transporting the content of the packets to the backends
by means of application specific proxies. Application-level
proxies are also known as application-level gateways, and
are available for common Internet services, e.g. an HTTP
proxy is used for Web access and an FTP proxy is used for
file transfers. Honeyd [17] provides application-level proxying
functionality. For instance, on TCP port 23, Honeyd can be
configured to automatically proxy traffic to another machine’s
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Telnet port. In contrast, the generic so called “circuit-level”
proxies (that conceptually work at the session layer of the
OSI model) give support to multiple applications. For example,
SOCKS is and IP-based circuit-level proxy server that supports
applications using TCP and UDP. Application-level proxies
provide better support for the additional capabilities of each
protocol (e.g. application-level proxies can better support virus
scanning) than circuit-level ones. Also, they are client-neutral
and require no special software components or operating
system on the client computer to enable the client to
communicate with servers through the proxy.
On the other hand, system activity monitoring needs to
capture the malicious activity in the HIHs. Clearly the activity
must be captured stealthily. Sebek [51] and Qebek [52] are
examples of the first honeypot monitoring tools used to
stealthily capture system activity. They modify the system
kernel by adding new kernel modules that capture system
activity in a supposedly hard to detect way. However, there
are nowadays some techniques that can detect the presence
of this type of kernel module installed inside honeypots. The
well-known CWSandbox [53] uses in-line code overwriting to
hook the API function in order to observe malware behavior
without being noticed. However, this approach still has the
possibility of being detected.
In order to address this drawback, Jiang and Wang
[54] proposed another monitoring approach called
“out-of-the-box”, which uses the virtualization hypervisor
to monitor the activity in guest virtual machines (VM).
VMI-Honeymon [13] uses a Volatility extension to call the
API of the Xen Access successor LibVMI to access the
memory of the guest VM. LibVMI [55] is a C library with
Python bindings based virtual machine introspection that can
support a variety of virtual machine hypervisors, such as Xen,
KVM, etc. It is easy to monitor the low-level details of a
running virtual honeypot by viewing its memory trapping on
hardware events and accessing the vCPU registers. There were
some other virtual machine introspection based approaches
that could analyze malware and simultaneously make it
harder for the malware to detect them, such as Livewire [56],
VMScope [54], Lares [57], VMWatcher [58], etc. However,
they are either not open-source software or not maintained
any longer. Nevertheless, the solutions in Table I do provide
maintained open-source code for particular hypervisors and
operating systems, as listed.
TABLE I
VIRTUAL HONEYPOT INTROSPECTION SOLUTIONS
Solution VM Hypervisor Supported OS
Argos [8] QEMU Windows
Nitro [59] QEMU Windows
Timescope [60] QEMU Linux
Virtuoso [61] QEMU Windows, Linux, OS X, Haiku
DRAKVUF [62] Xen Windows
Cuckoo [20] KVM Windows, Linux, OS X, Android
2) Attack Prevention: it is aimed at detering or blocking
intrusions. This function can be carried out by several
approaches: data filtering, tarpitting and containment.
Filtering consists of discarding the data traffic. This is
typically specified by means of filtering rules. There are two
filtering mechanisms: source-destination based and content
based. Source-destination based filtering examines the
header information (mainly source and destination addresses,
ports and protocols) of each packet to make the discarding
decision. This mechanism is effective at reducing the amount
of repeated traffic into non-redundant manageable data. iSinks
[25] uses a filtering strategy of analyzing the connections
established with the first N destination IPs per every source
IP. Pang et al. [63] improved the filtering mechanism by
taking into account the source port, destination and connection.
Bailey et al. [64] improved the source-destination based
filtering mechanism by expanding the individual darknets
into multiple darknets for observing the global behavior and
the source distribution. Content based filtering inspects the
content or payload of the packets to make the discarding
decision. Bailey et al. [10] proposed content prevalence as
a filtering mechanism by inspecting the first packet of each
new payload. Content prevalence analyzes the distribution
of content sequences in payloads, and generates an alert
when a specific piece of content sequence becomes prevalent.
Similarly, IMS [24] proposed a caching mechanism to avoid
recording duplicated payloads, by only recording the first
payload packets in order to reduce disk utilization. A potential
drawback of packet inspection based filtering is that it
is unable to make a decision until the session has been
established and at least the first packet of content or payload
has been received. SweetBait [65] uses whitelists to filter the
traffic that matches benevolent patterns in order to conduct
zero-day worm detection. RolePlayer [66] can emulate both
the client and the server side of an application session in
order to replay and filter variant well-known attacks. Shadow
honeypot [5] uses a signature-based IDS to filter well-known
attacks and then applies an anomaly-based IDS to filter the
input into suspect traffic for further investigation.
Tarpitting consists of purposely slowing down the progress
of an attack, worm propagation, or virus sprawl, etc.
Collapsar’s [67] tarpit module restricts an outgoing attack
from a honeypot by throttling the packet rate that can be
sent. Honeywall [68] is also a tarpit device that can limit the
number of outgoing connections. It can block any outbound
connection when it is capturing automated attacks, or when
it is investigating manual attacks. It can be programmed to
allow a limited number of outbound connections, such as 5
to 10 connections per hour. However, this strict data tarpitting
will raise an adversary’s suspicion, as well as increase the
chance of being detected, and impede data capture.
Containment is another approach to preventing an
adversary from using a compromised honeypot to attack
other non-Honeypot systems, through confining the attack
in the honeypot environment. In order to reduce the
risk of being detected, it redirects the outbound attacks
back to other honeypots, rather than limits the number
of outgoing connections or discards them. Alata et al.
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[69] implemented such an outgoing connection redirection
mechanism by modifying the Linux system kernel. Outgoing
traffic redirection has some drawback as well: it uses
the “in-the-box” approach, which allows some advanced
adversaries to detect the redirection module.
3) Attack Detection: this function aims at detecting
intrusion and generating alerts. There are two common
detection approaches: signature-based and anomaly-based.
Signature-based detection identifies well-known attacks by
recognizing malicious patterns. This approach is often used in
production environments to discover unauthorised activity and
generate alerts to administrators. Unlike the attacks captured
by IDSs, which may contain false alerts, the traffic received
by honeypots will almost always correspond to malicious
activities, as the honeypots have no production value. Attack
detection honeypots therefore have a highly reduced false
alarm rate. This type of honeypot is often called a production
honeypot and emulates well-known vulnerabilities to lure and
deceive intruders so that they waste their time interacting with
the honeypot. Production honeypots are often LIHs and MIHs
that have little or no interaction with either the attacker or
production systems in order to minimize the risk of infecting
them. Furthermore, the performance and response times of
production honeypots should be guaranteed and similar to
production systems. For example, the production honeypot
Dionaea [18] can simulate multiple well-known services to
carry out signature-based detection.
Anomaly-based detection identifies unknown attacks by
discovering deviations from patterns of normal behaviour.
Honeypots using this detection approach are always used
in research environments as research honeypots. A research
honeypot is designed to detect anomalies and investigate
unknown signatures. Thus, research honeypots are often
more powerful than production honeypots. HIHs and hybrid
honeypot systems are always used as research ones to provide
fully functional systems. A wider assortment of data can be
captured to facilitate further investigation. Research honeypots
are a step ahead of production ones. The signatures of new
attacks discovered by research honeypots are often used
to update production ones, and provide an early warning
and prediction of future attacks and exploits. A number
of anomaly-based detection techniques have been proposed
in the context of honeypot research. For example, Argos
[8] applies dynamic taint analysis [70] to detect zero-day
attacks and generate new signatures; Honeycomb [71] uses the
longest common substring (LCS) algorithm to detect repeating
patterns in order to spot worms; and Bailey’s system[10]
performs system behavior profiling by comparing an infected
virtual filesystem with an uninfected one. In addition, some
current learning techniques, such as the deep learning approach
for NIDS [72], can also be used in decoys so as to acquire
new detection skills for identifying unknown attacks.
Apart from the traditional IDS techniques, Sekar et al.
[73] proposed Specification-based Anomaly Detection using
a supervised method to develop the specification, instead
of unsupervised machine learning techniques. This identifies
legitimate behavior and detects unknown attacks as deviations
from the norm. Not only does it improve the effectiveness of
anomaly detection over signature-based approaches, but also
minimizes the large number of false positives produced by
other anomaly-based techniques.
4) Attack Response: it relates to the measures taken to
respond to attacks and adapt to intrusion events based on
pre-defined requirements. These honeypots can take two type
of reaction: traffic redirection and decoy reconfiguration.
a) Traffic redirection: it is used to control how traffic
is sent to an appropriate destination. For example, hybrid
honeypots redirect malicious traffic from a LIH to an isolated
HIH for further investigation. We review two redirection
techniques: Flow-based routing and TCP connection replaying.
Flow-based routing is where packets are routed from
source to destination by selecting the path that satisfies some
requirements such as QoS, load balance, security, etc. This
mechanism is based on the same principles as used for normal
network routing, but is applied to more specific data flows.
Kohler et al. [74] proposed the flexible and configurable Click
modular router, which is made of simple packet processing
modules that are combined in a service chain in order to
build complex and efficient network services that can be
used to do flow based routing. There are several cooperative
honeypot systems that use the Click framework to facilitate
data control. For example, the Potemkin gateway router and
the GQ gateway are based on the Click modular router.
With the rapid growth of software-defined networking (SDN),
OpenFlow was designed to allow users to programmatically
control real switches (from companies like Cisco, HP, etc.) by
means of applications running on SDN controller frameworks.
The SDN controller can facilitate the fine-grained dynamic
control of traffic by means of flow table entries configured on
each OpenFlow switch. In the near future, programmable SDN
based network architectures will increasingly take the role of
data control for honeypot systems [75].
TCP connection replaying is a connection handover
technique aimed at seamlessly transferring a TCP socket
endpoint from one node to another. When an interesting
connection is established between the attacker and a LIH, a
TCP connection handoff mechanism is needed to redirect the
connection from the LIH to a HIH for further investigation.
It transfers the established TCP state of the socket endpoint
from the original node to the new one, and then the new
node can continue the conversation with the other TCP
endpoint directly. Bailey’s system [10] avoids conserving
the state of every connection, since the connection handoff
mechanism makes the redirection decision based on the first
payload packet of each connection. However, the author
did not unveil the technical detail about the connection
handoff. The Honeybrid gateway [76] uses the connection
replay mechanism to implement transparent traffic redirection
between LIHs and HIHs. Furthermore, Honeybrid revealed
the technical details of the gateway, which is a TCP replay
proxy using libnetfilter queue [77] to process packets. The
connection handoff mechanism based on TCP replay is able
to provide stealthy redirection for automated malware. In
[78], Lin et al. proposed a transparent and secure network
environment which allows automated malware to attack
or propagate, but under stealthy control. Although TCP/IP
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stateful traffic replay can facilitate transparent TCP connection
handoff, it cannot solve the identical-fingerprint problem,
because the LIH and HIH have different fingerprints (e.g.
IP and MAC addresses). This problem leaves the opportunity
for the skilled adversary to detect the honeypot environment.
VMI-Honeymon [79] provided a novel solution that retains
the MAC and IP address of the original HIH for cloned HIHs
but creates separate network bridges to isolate them so as to
avoid address collisions. Fan et al. [80], [81] proposed a hybrid
honeypots based traffic redirection mechanism intending for
addressing the identical-fingerprint problem. Its drawbacks
are that different honeypots using the identical-fingerprint
have to frequently switch up and down according to research
requirements, and it is hard to conduct large-scale deployment
using the proposed hybrid architecture. Most recently, Fan
and Ferna´ndez [82] proposed a novel SDN based stealthy
TCP connection handover mechanism that solved this problem
through using different ports of an OpenFlow based switch to
isolate the honeypots whilst keeping identical-fingerprints.
b) Decoy reconfiguration: it is designed to timely adapt
the decoy’s state to specific events, which could be intrusion
events, state variation of targets, etc. As stated, static honeypot
systems lack the capability to reconfigure the decoy timely.
This is a critical disadvantage when honeypots are deployed in
complex and dynamic network scenarios. Several approaches
have been proposed to address this problem, which can be
categorised into dynamic cloning and dynamic catering.
Dynamic cloning synchronously emulates the real
production targets including network topologies, operating
system fingerprints, services, open ports, etc. It is designed to
rapidly alter the configuration and deployment by monitoring
and learning the target organization’s network in real time.
Thus, dynamic cloning has two phases. The first phase is
called network discovery, and is used to collect information
about the target network. The second phase is called honeypot
deployment, which deploys decoys that emulate the target
systems. There are two ways to discover the targets: passive
and active fingerprinting. Hecker et al. [83] discuss both
ways for network discovery and automated honeynet cloning.
Passive fingerprinting tools, such as p0f [84], can sniff the
traffic, determine active systems and open ports in the target
scenario, whilst making little traffic noise. However, the
main problem of this approach is that it does not discover
the systems that do not generate any production traffic.
Instead, active probing tools, such as Nmap [85], can discover
all open ports on the target system, even if there is no
production traffic to those ports, at the price of generating
some extra production traffic. In [9], a dynamic hybrid
honeypot systems is proposed for intrusion detection. It
consists of a combination of LIHs and HIHs, and relies on
active probing to get information about the organization’s
network. In the network discovery phase, the active probing
tool Nmap [85] is used to determine the active systems and
open ports. Then in the honeypot deployment phase, LIHs
are created periodically by Honeyd [17] to represent the
production systems. It also uses virtual HIHs to receive the
redirected traffic from the LIHs, but the dynamic deployment
of HIHs is not mentioned.
Dynamic catering is used to create honeypots that cater for
certain attacks by gradually escalating the interaction level to
capture malicious data, and redeploy honeypots when intrusion
activity is detected. The idea is to create and deploy honeypots
on demand to increase the efficiency of data capture. Potemkin
[26] used dynamically created HIHs on physical servers to
achieve efficient resource usage. It employs a network gateway,
to which routers all over the Internet tunnel traffic. The
gateway acts as an agent to send traffic to a honeyfarm
server. The gateway instructs the virtual machine monitor
(VMM) that runs on each physical server to create a new
HIH on demand for each active destination IP address. When
an HIH is idle, the gateway instructs the VMM to destroy it
and reclaim the resources. VMI-Honeymon [79] clones VMs
by restoring the memory snapshot of its configuration on a
QEMU copy-on-write (qcow2) filesystem. The newly created
virtual HIH runs the system and applications with the same
fingerprints as the cloned one for investigating the attacks.
5) Attack Profiling: it is the extrapolation of attack
information in order to analyze malicious activity, as well as
unveil the intruder’s motives. McGrew and Vaughn, Jr. [86]
indicated that an attack profile should contain the following
attributes:
Motivation describes the reason of the attack;
Breadth/Depth presents the scope of the attack and the
degree of impact to the attacked system;
Sophistication shows the level of technical expertise needed
to carry out the attack;
Concealment describes the measures used for hiding
evidence of the attack;
Attacker(s) defines the entity(ies) behind the attack: an
individual or a group of adversaries, and identifies the
source of the attack, e.g. automated malware;
Vulnerability is the flaw that can be exploited by the attack;
Tools are the software used to carry out attacks, including:
shellcodes, back-doors, rootkits, and other software
uploaded to the system to perform the rest of the attack.
Some of these attributes can be obtained directly from
the captured honeypot data. For example. through statistically
analyzing the log information, including the attack source,
destination and frequency, as well as the infection degree
on the HIH, we can identify the breadth and depth of the
attack. Also, the concealment and tools can be identified by
observing the adversary’s activity on the honeypot. Using basic
statistics on the log information is called direct information
based attack profiling. Some honeypots, e.g. Honeyd [17] and
Dionaea [18], use the IP source, destination and timestamp of
an attack to describe the attack profile.
However, the other attributes have to be obtained from
derived information. Motivation can be inferred from insights
into the activity on the HIH. Identifying the attacker and
the sophistication needs in-depth observation and forensics
on the interaction between the attacker and the honeypot.
Determining the vulnerabilities often needs advanced detection
techniques. Therefore, derived information based attack
profiling is much more complex, since it tries to assess
and explain the fundamental cause of the attack. Basic
statistics are insufficient for this. It is necessary to apply
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multiple approaches, e.g. association rule mining, neural
networks, virtual machine introspection, etc. Currently, plenty
of techniques have been suggested for analysing malicious
data: Nawrocki et al. [11] reviewed the different approaches
for analysing honeypot data; Egele et al. [87] surveyed
automated dynamic malware analysis techniques and tools;
Rieck et al. [88] presented the research on machine learning
techniques for honeypot system behavior analysis.
C. The design space and constraints
Depending on the classification scheme, the honeypot
designer can theoretically observe at most 103680 different
combinations of classes, which provides a global view of the
design space of homogeneous honeypots. However, we have
to note that some features are mutually exclusive (see Fig. 5)
and this leads to a reduction of the design space.
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Fig. 5. Constraints between main features
From the point of view of resisting attacks, malicious data
can be captured when honeypots are probed, attacked and
compromised. This corresponds exactly to the three phases
of a cyber attack, i.e. probe, exploit and violate. Attacks
always begin by probing large-scale IP networks in order to
find vulnerable nodes, and then exploiting the vulnerabilities
to compromise the nodes. Finally, if the compromised nodes
are worth utilizing, the adversary will violate them, e.g. by
installing rootkits, setting up backdoors, or launching new
attacks etc. The large-scale probing will produce high network
traffic, but it will not translate into useful system activity.
When the vulnerable nodes are attacked, i.e. in the exploiting
phase, the scale of the attack is reduced, but the data quality
is enhanced, i.e. the attacking traffic will include malicious
payloads. In the violating phase, only a small part of the
compromised network i.e. several specific nodes, will be
involved, and the data quality becomes very high because
any unauthorized system data is worth recording for further
investigation. Therefore, every phase produces different data
quantity and quality. The fidelity and scalability features are
highly related to the three attack phases.
However, fidelity and scalability are a pair of mutually
competing features in a decoy. In order to capture high
quality data, the decoy has to increase the interaction level.
However, a higher interaction level leads to a higher risk
of being compromised, so the honeypot has to enhance the
security program to protect the decoy. Consequently, higher
interaction guarantees the fidelity but sacrifices scalability,
which will result in failing to capture adequate data from
large-scale IP networks. So there needs to be a good balance
between these two features in order to optimize the use
of honeypot resources. Cooperative honeypots, particularly
hybrid honeypots have been developed to overcome these
issues.
Also, from the above discussion, we can see that attack
profiling by the security program is highly related to the
fidelity of the decoy. If the security program wants to perform
attack profiling based on derived information, the decoy needs
a high interaction level in order to record detailed enough
information (i.e. system activity) about the attack. Otherwise,
if the honeypot is a LIH or MIH, the attack profiling can only
use direct information.
Furthermore, adaptability is highly related to the P/V.
It is observable that physical honeypots are often static,
while virtualization technology has made it easy to create
dynamic honeypots. The software artifice is the easiest way
to enforce dynamic configuration, and at present, virtual
machine based HIHs are increasingly convenient to perform
dynamic configuration. So, reconfiguration of the decoy’s
attack response is also tightly related to the P/V.
Overall, the design space can help to predict future
theoretical honeypot designs, while the constraints among
the different features can provide a more practical way for
the designer to implement honeypots in specific technical
environments.
IV. HONEYPOT DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
This section surveys a number of typical honeypots,
including independent and cooperative ones, by applying the
D-P based taxonomy. The comparison is illustrated in Table II.
It shows the proposed D-P based taxonomy can fully classify
these different types of honeypots. Also, some development
trends were discerned and these will be analyzed in the
following subsections.
A. Hybrid honeypots
According to the requirement of decoupling and achieving
optimization of both fidelity and scalability, many cooperative
honeypots (particularly, hybrid honeypots) have been
developed (see the right part of Table II). A typical hybrid
honeypot consists of three subsystems: frontends, controller
and backends. The backends can be HIHs or a honeyfarm, the
frontends can be LIHs (or MIHs) or sinkholes for monitoring
large-scale routed IP address spaces, and the controller can
be a Honeywall, Click modular router, or Honeybrid gateway,
etc. These three subsystems facilitate a number of functions.
The frontends often provide low interaction with the attacks,
because their main objective is to capture network data.
However, they need to discard the uninteresting traffic in
order to capture fine-grained data. The controllers are used
to perform the functions of data control as well as dynamic
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF HONEYPOT SYSTEMS IN TERMS OF D-P BASED TAXONOMY
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Fidelity
Low                          
Medium                          
High                          
Physicality / Virtuality (P/V)
Physical                          
Virtual
Software artifice                          
VMware                          
UML                          
Xen                          
QEMU                          
KVM                          
Scalability
Unscalable                          
Scalable                          
Adaptability
Static                          
Dynamic                          
Role
Server                          
Client                          
Deployment Strategy
Sacrificial lamb                          
Deception ports                          
Proximity decoys                          
Minefield                          
Redirection shield                          
Resource Type
General                          
Web application                          
VoIP                          
SSH                          
Bluetooth                          
USB                          
SCADA/ICS                          
IoT                          
IPv6 networks                          
Attack Monitoring
Application layer proxying                          
GRE tunneling                          
In-the-box                          
Out-of-the-box                          
Attack Prevention
Source-destination filtering                          
Content filtering                          
Tarpitting                          
Containment                          
Attack Detection
Signature-based                          
Anomaly-based                          
Attack Response
Flow based routing                          
TCP connection replaying                          
Dynamic cloning                          
Dynamic catering                          
Attack Profiling
Direct information                          
Derived information                          
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system configuration in a hidden way. The backends perform
stealthy system data capture and data analysis such as digital
forensics to unveil the attacker’s skills, tactics and motives.
Table III shows a comparison of the subsystems of various
hybrid honeypots.
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF SUBSYSTEMS OF HYBRID HONEYPOTS
Hybrid honeypot Frontend Controller Backend
Bailey’s system Honeyd A central VMware VM
controller
Artail’s system Honeyd Honeywall Physical machine
GQ Network Click based VMware ESX
telescopes router
SweetBait Honeyd+ - QEMU based Argos
honeycomb
Honeybrid Honeyd Honeybrid VMware VM
gateway
SGNET Honeyd+ SGNET QEMU based Argos
ScriptGen gateway
Li’s system Spamtrap+ - Phoneypot
Phoneybot+
Phoneytoken
VMI-Honeymon Dionaea Honeybrid Xen VM
gateway
IoTPOT Frontend - QEMU based IoTBox
responder
Hyhoneydv6 Honeydv6 - QEMU VM
We see that Honeyd takes the role of frontend in most
hybrid honeypots. The wide applications of Honeyd are
probably accounted for by its advantages of lightweight
design, distributed appearance, programmable components and
dynamic features. Honeyd is a virtual LIH framework that can
deploy multiple decoys concurrently following a configurable
network topology. Though it can only emulate LIHs, it still
has several advantages: 1) based on the OS fingerprinting
database of Nmap, it can fabricate decoys with almost all the
common OS fingerprints; 2) users can implement their own
fake service responses in python in order to capture data -
Honeyd may even emulate a service so that it actually collects
more information than a HIH would; 3) it can dynamically
reconfigure the decoys by using a doorway called Honeydctl
to communicate the inner workings of Honeyd.
A number of controllers have been developed that provide
the security functions, e.g. inbound data filtering, outbound
data containment, dynamic configuration, etc. Most of them
are based on programable frameworks, e.g. GQ gateway is
based on Click, and Honeybrid gateway is based on libnetfilter.
These programmable frameworks allow the developers to
implement their own data control functions according to their
specific requirements.
Most hybrid honeypots use virtual machines to deploy their
backends. The most popular hypervisors are Xen and QEMU.
Many dynamic configuration and virtual memory introspection
solutions have been proposed based on these hypervisors. With
the evolution of QEMU-KVM, we can foresee that the KVM
will be in charge of deploying HIHs for the backends. A
detailed analysis of virtual honeypot development is described
in the next subsection.
B. Virtual honeypots
The development of honeypots now relies heavily on
the progress of virtualization technology. Virtual honeypots
provide several valuable advantages: ease of maintenance,
dynamic configuration and anti-detection.
Virtualization leads to ease of maintenance. First, by
using virtualization technology, one physical machine can
simultaneously host multiple virtual honeypots, which
can significantly improve resource efficiency. Second, the
time-consuming task of large-scale honeypot deployment is
greatly decreased by using virtualization techniques that only
take several minutes to deploy rather than several hours on
physical machines, e.g. the physical honeypot designed by
Cliff Stoll in 1986 [14].
Virtualization also facilitates dynamic configuration, which
is often used to reduce the response times to specific events.
As previously stated, dynamic honeypots can be used to clone
production systems and to synchronize with their changes in a
timely manner. They can also be used to investigate intrusions
by modifying their own state according to the requirements
of the attack research. For example, dynamic configuration
can facilitate redirection containment by redirecting the traffic
back to a dynamically created honeypot, in order to control the
outbound attack rather than using the brute tarpitting approach.
This function also improves the capability of anti-detection,
which is described next.
Anti-detection aims to avoid the honeypot being detected.
Virtualization technology provides several ways to hide both
the decoy and the security program. The security program
is hidden firstly, by virtual machine memory introspection
that facilitates “out-of-the-box” monitoring. This improves the
stealthy monitoring capability of HIHs. Secondly, because
the brute tarpitting approach is easy to be detected by a
skilled adversary, dynamic honeypot systems often redirect
the outbound traffic back into the honeynet for anti-detection.
For limited-function honeypots, anti-detection focuses on
camouflaging the fact that the decoy is a honeypot. For
example, because the link latency of a Honeyd based decoy
can lead to its detection, Fu et al. [92] reduced this in order
to camouflage the Honeyd based decoy. Additionally, once
a decoy has been detected, the inbound traffic rate by the
attacker will be reduced [93], so in this case, the system can
redeploy the decoy to perform anti-detection.
C. Special purpose honeypots
An increasing number of special purpose honeypots
[88], [47], [48], [49] have been developed. Firstly, both
independent honeypots and cooperative honeypots are
focused on developing specific attacked-resource oriented
honeypots. These honeypots focus on fully emulating one
type of information resource so that they can obtain
fine-grained data. With the rapid growth of cyberspace, both
SCADA/ICS and IoT systems are faced with increasing
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cyber threats. Consequently, honeypots for these are now
being developed. Thus, the trend in honeypot development
closely follows industrial developments. Secondly, research
honeypots, particularly for anomaly-detection and attack
profiling, have become increasingly numerous. These rely on
cutting-edge computer science technologies, such as machine
learning, big data analysis, etc.
V. CONCLUSION
As a rapidly developing technology, honeypots have become
a hot research topic in the field of computer and network
security. From a variety of honeypot systems, we have
captured the two common essential elements: the decoy
and the security program. We have highlighted the trend to
decouple these two elements from tight to loose coupling, in
order to reduce the risk that a change within one component
will create unanticipated changes within the other.
Based on this core concept, we have proposed the D-P based
taxonomy for honeypot systems, which helps us to investigate
honeypot systems and techniques. Thanks to the taxonomy,
we identified various decoy features, and reviewed a number
of honeypot related technologies and related cutting-edge
computer science technologies. Broadly speaking, current
honeypot development have followed two approaches:
independent honeypots and cooperative honeypots. On the one
hand, owing to the advantages of lightweight design, low-cost
development, ease of management, resource efficiency, etc,
independent honeypots have steadily developed in various
application scenarios, with numerous examples of specific
attacked-resource oriented honeypots emerging as independent
software. On the other hand, cooperative honeypots can not
only provide broader views due to their distributed and
cooperative deployment in different network domains, but
also create opportunities for early network anomaly detection,
attack correlation, and global network status inference. Also,
cooperative honeypots have robustness, reliability, reusability,
and understandability because of their decoupling feature.
All in all, though current honeypots have been evolving to
be increasingly complex and powerful, the decoy and security
program are the two fundamental elements, which originate
all the development in this important area. Therefore our
work can help security researchers gain insights into honeypot
research and explore the designs and application space of
future honeypot systems.
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